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In arbitrations concerning the stability of a host country’s regulatory framework, many 
tribunals have echoed a contention from the tribunal in Saluka v. The Czech Republic: 
“[No] investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the 
investment is made remain totally unchanged.” 1  Conversely, no investor should 
reasonably expect that every regulation would change. While no reasonable person could 
argue with either of these statements, neither of them helps to resolve disputes over a host 
country’s regulations and policies.  
 
In an effort to find common ground between these extremes, scholars and arbitrators have 
suggested that the reasonableness of investors’ expectations should be based (in part) on 
socio-economic conditions in the host country at the time of the investment.
2
 This 
suggestion has merit: an investor’s level of expectations in Malaysia during the East 
Asian crisis should not be the same as its expectations in Chile during times of financial 
stability. To date, most tribunals’ efforts to examine host country conditions have failed 
to provide thorough retrospective assessments that accurately reflect the future status of 
regulatory frameworks. More specifically, such efforts have relied on stereotypes of 





The Parkerings tribunal’s one-sentence summary of the investment climate in Lithuania 
in 1998 illustrates the cursory assessments of socio-economic conditions that some 
tribunals have used to reject claimants’ arguments under the fair and equitable treatment 
clause. “The political environment in Lithuania was characteristic of a country in 
transition from being a part of the Soviet Union to a candidate for European Union (EU) 
membership.” 4  The tribunal’s analysis not only failed to consider the stage of 
development or differences among former Soviet republics, but also failed to evaluate 
factors directly related to the stability of regulatory frameworks over time. Unlike the 
Parkerings tribunal, the arbitrators in Duke Energy v. Ecuador recognized the need for 
comprehensive assessments that consider many aspects of a host country’s investment 
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climate. Nevertheless, the Duke Energy tribunal’s review of the context in which the 
claimant established its expectations relied on very few factors.
5
 Because shortsighted 
assessments do not look for specific precursors to outcomes, they do not help tribunals 
understand how conditions in host countries at specific points in time should impact 
expectations about a project’s exposure to political risks. 
 
Still, assessments of host countries remain important ways in which to determine the 
reasonableness of an investor’s expectations. Political risk analysis can help investors and 
tribunals establish legitimate expectations that reflect actual conditions in the host 
country that impact future exposures. 
 
Political risk analysts examine economic, political, financial, and social conditions in host 
countries to determine the likelihood that political decisions or social events will have a 
negative impact on an FDI project. In order to assess the stability of a regulatory 
framework over the course of an investment, political risk analysts examine the strength 
of the host country’s political institutions. Democratic institutions have a positive impact 
on regulatory stability.
6
 Host governments facilitate policy and regulatory stability by 
building strong institutions that provide checks and balances within policy frameworks.
7
 
For example, in countries in which judicial institutions and regulators operate 
independently from elected officials, discriminatory policies are unlikely to be upheld or 
implemented. For this reason, analysts review factors that indicate the degree of 
autonomy that is granted to judicial institutions.  
 
Analysts also consider aspects of a project to determine an investor’s exposure to 
regulatory instability. For example, the political sensitivity of oil exploration projects 
leaves investors more vulnerable to government interference than investors who 
manufacture t-shirts.  
 
Political risk analysis can have a significant impact on arbitral disputes. Ideally, 
arbitrators who obtain customized, historical political risk reports can review the 
conditions that directly impact regulatory frameworks at the time when expectations were 
framed. Where tribunals do not have access to customized reports, general political risk 
assessments can still help arbitrators understand other factors that indirectly impact 
regulatory frameworks.  
 
While political risk analysis cannot guarantee specific outcomes, it can provide investors 
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